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ABSTRACT: In the mid-1970s, Jimmy Carter, first as a candidate
and later as president, announced his intention to remove US forces
from the Korean peninsula. By publicly opposing the plan as part
of a Fabian strategy, senior Army leaders gained public support of
their position and the president suspended the planned withdrawal.

D

irect military opposition to national policy is rare and generally
unsuccessful. In the late 1970s, however, senior Army officers
in Korea directly opposed President Jimmy Carter’s goal of
withdrawing US troops from the Korean peninsula. After the relief of one
general officer, they adopted an indirect strategy that included inflating
threat assessments of North Korea and cultivating ties with congressional
members skeptical of Carter’s plan. These efforts succeeded, and Carter
decided in 1979 to suspend the withdrawal of US troops. This episode
illustrates a fundamental ethical and bureaucratic tension between
servicemembers’ desires to influence defense policy, particularly in
regions or on topics where the military has long-standing connections
and expertise, and their desire to serve their civilian masters honorably.
This article describes how Army officers effectively circumvented official
policy by using bureaucratic measures that also protected them from
being relieved from duty.
Studies of disagreements between presidential administrations and
military officers abound. But most focus on major crisis events—such as
Harry S. Truman’s firing of General Douglas MacArthur or the actions,
or inactions, of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Vietnam—which obscure a
much wider range of civil-military interactions that often shape defense
policies. Recent academic attention on the relief of officers and military
resignations unfortunately highlights rare situations rather than the dayto-day policy process.1 The debate on military resignations is particularly
puerile because only one Army general officer, Major General Edwin A.
Walker, has resigned since World War II.2
Rather than opposing policy directly, US officers have had more
success with a Fabian strategy of gradually leveraging Congress, the
1      James M. Dubik, “Taking a ‘Pro’ Position on Principled Resignation,” Armed Forces and Society
43, no. 1 (January 2017): 17–28; Jim Golby, “Beyond the Resignation Debate: A New Framework for
Civil-Military Dialogue,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 9, no. 3 (Fall 2015): 18–46; Peter D. Feaver, “Resign
in Protest? A Cure Worse Than Most Diseases,” Armed Forces and Society 43, no. 1 (January 2017):
29–40; and Don M. Snider, “Should General Dempsey Resign? Army Professionals and the Moral
Space for Dissent,” Strategic Studies Institute, October 21, 2014.
2      Warren Weaver Jr., “Pension Restored for Gen. Walker,” New York Times, July 24, 1983, 17.
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media, and elements of the bureaucracy, such as the intelligence services,
to exhaust a presidential administration’s resolve. Roman General Fabius
delayed and obstructed the Carthaginian General Hannibal in a similar
manner. In a direct battle, presidential authority can be overpowering.
In such cases, an administration has every incentive to demonstrate its
power. In contrast, a recalcitrant institution, which is decentralized and
has deep connections to other organizations, can force an administration
to expend irreplaceable time and capital in the political equivalent of a
guerilla war.
General Colin Powell’s successful effort to stop President Bill
Clinton’s gays-in-the-military initiative provides a classic example
of a Fabian strategy in civil-military relations. Through consultation
with sympathetic members of Congress from both parties, a network
of retired generals, and public statements that obliquely encouraged
critiques of the president, Powell slowed the implementation of an
announced policy. After a nearly yearlong delay, a much different “Don’t
Ask, Don’t Tell” policy emerged that maintained a ban on homosexuals
serving openly in the US military.3
The actions of Army officers, particularly those of the United
Nations Commander, and later Chief of Staff of the Army, General John
W. Vessey Jr., in delaying and rallying opposition to stop presidential
decisions to withdraw troops from Korea is a more impressive
demonstration of the Army’s institutional power. In the late 1970’s,
Vessey was outside Washington, DC, and the Army, still reeling from
Vietnam, had little public support.
Moreover, the dispute centered on military basing overseas, a subject
that did not have a natural domestic political constituency to energize
public opinion. As in the Powell case, Army officers working to stop
the withdrawal noted a lack of consultation before President Carter’s
decision, which was perceived as both a flawed policy process and
disrespectful to the military. The Army made the topic a public debate
where it could use specialized information and professional expertise to
stymie a presidential policy that clashed with the Army’s assessments of
America’s national security interests.

A Leader, for a Change

In the post-Watergate election of 1976, Georgia Governor Jimmy
Carter projected an image that conveyed transparency and simplicity in
government, using the campaign slogan “A Leader, for a Change.” During
the campaign, he made vague statements about phasing out US troops
in South Korea, explaining, “he favored taking US troops out of Korea
and would be prepared to begin as soon as he became President.” 4 Some
reports indicated analysts from the Brookings Institution convinced
3      Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2003), 201–4; and Daniel Bessner and Eric Lorber, “Toward a Theory of
Civil-Military Punishment,” Armed Forces and Society 38, no. 4 (October 2012): 658–61.
4      Don Oberdorfer, “Carter’s Decision on Korea Traced Back to January, 1975,” Washington Post,
June 12, 1977.
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Carter to believe “the large US presence in South Korea amounted to a
‘trip wire’ that could automatically involve the United States in another
Asian land war.” 5 These analysts, many of whom would later work for
the Carter administration, argued for the United States to draw down
forces overseas to focus primarily on Japan, leaving Korea and Taiwan
as tangential Third World security interests.6
Carter was also drawing on a new generation of foreign policy
analysts who were shaped by what they perceived to be the lessons of
Vietnam, foremost among them an overreach in American objectives
and an excessive use of military force. Many of Carter’s policies,
particularly those for East Asia and Korea, were formulated by Jerome
Cohen, a well-known peace activist with an antimilitary reputation, who
had no military experience and was a staunch critic of South Korean
President Park Chung Hee’s human rights abuses. On June 23, 1976,
Carter implied military support would be contingent on larger issues
in the bilateral relationship and on subjective moral assessments rather
than an objective security policy:
I believe it will be possible to withdraw our ground forces from South Korea
on a phased basis over a time span to be determined after consultation with
both South Korea and Japan. At the same time, it should be made clear to
the South Korean Government that its internal oppression is repugnant to
our people, and undermines the support of our commitment there.7

Carter’s withdrawal plan fulfilled several key political goals. First,
it offered Carter an opportunity to reinforce his moral policies and to
provide a high-minded rationale for the withdrawal. Second, removing
US forces from Korea provided the president the option to commit
forces elsewhere. Lastly, withdrawal respected the public’s skepticism of
foreign military engagement, particularly in Asia, giving Carter an easy
political win.
During his first months in office, Carter attempted to create policies
and strategies that reflected his campaign promises, and the withdrawal
of ground forces from Korea was given high priority. He immediately
directed the Policy Review Committee (PRC) to reexamine US policies
toward the Korean peninsula before March 7, 1977. 8 Normally the
member of the National Security Council with a primary interest in
the issue chaired the committee. But despite the military nature of the
issue, the State Department’s Cyrus Vance led the committee. As the
5      Larry A. Niksch, “U.S. Troop Withdrawal from South Korea: Past Shortcomings and Future
Prospects,” Asian Survey 21 (March 1981): 326–28; and Steven L. Rearden and Kenneth R. Foulks,
The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1977–1980 (Washington DC: Office of Joint History,
2015), 154.
6      Barry M. Blechman, Edward M. Gramlich, and Robert W. Hartman, Setting National Priorities:
The 1975 Budget (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1974), 129.
7      Jimmy Carter, “Relations between the World’s Democracies” (speech, Foreign Policy
Association, New York, NY, June 23, 1976) Department of State, Office of the Historian, accessed
November 14, 2018.
8      Jimmy Carter to the Attorney General, memorandum, “Korea: Presidential Review
Memorandum/NSC-13,” January 29, 1977, Washington, DC, Carter Presidential Library and
Museum, accessed November 27, 2018.
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administration sought to accelerate the process to reach a predetermined conclusion, senior officials also endeavored to limit military
participation. On February 2, 1977, National Security Advisor
Zbigneiw Brzezinski’s staff successfully cancelled Vessey’s upcoming
Congressional testimony based upon the general’s opposition to
the withdrawal.9
Early in the review process, the administration appeared to have
already decided its policy to the point that Department of Defense input
would merely be a formality. To many, Vice President Walter Mondale’s
public statement, “We will phase down our ground forces only in close
consultation and cooperation with the Governments of Japan and
South Korea,” confirmed the policy had already been decided.10 In
fact, Carter privately confirmed he had reached a decision on March
5, 1977—before comments or discussion from the State Department,
Defense Department, or Central Intelligence Agency—when he gave
a handwritten note to Brzezinski and Vance: “American forces will be
withdrawn. Air cover continued.” 11 Since the president announced the
4-to-5 year withdrawal schedule nearly two months before the policy
became official, many in the bureaucracy felt no genuine discussion had
occurred.12 The review had been a check-the-block exercise centered not
on whether to withdraw but how.
Overall, the president’s development of a new national security policy
regarding the Korean peninsula was severely flawed. The administration
made poorly considered campaign promises official through a sham
process that excluded major sources of information indicative of Samuel
Huntington’s observation: “The problem of the modern state is not
armed revolt but the relation of the expert to the politician.” 13 Driven by
his desire to be a popular politician, Carter created severe tension with
his primary experts on South Korea—US Army officers.

An Army in Opposition

The withdrawal plan was not popular with US Army officers in
South Korea. As the Korean War approached a stalemate in 1953, the
US presence there rapidly declined from roughly 400,000 troops to a
stable deterrent force of roughly 55,000 personnel, mostly assigned to
two Army divisions. During the 1950s and early 1960s, an assignment to
   9      Michael Armacost to Zbigniew Brzezinski, memorandum, 0297, “General Vessey’s Testimony
on Korean Troop Withdrawals,” February 2, 1977, container 1, NSA 26, records of the Office of the
National Security Advisor (Brzezinski), Carter Presidential Library and Museum.
10      Hubert H. Humphrey and John Glenn, U.S. Troop Withdrawal from the Republic of Korea: A
Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate (Washington, DC: US Government
Printing Office, 1978), 20.
11      “Handwritten Note from Jimmy Carter for Zbigniew Brzezinski and Cyrus Vance, 5 March
1977,” in The Carter Chill: US-ROK-DPRK Trilateral Relations, 1976–1979 (Washington DC: North
Korea International Documentation Project, n.d.), 77.
12      Humphrey and Glenn, U.S. Troop Withdrawal, 20; and Jimmy Carter to the Vice President,
Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense, “U.S. Policy in Korea Presidential Directive/NSC-12,”
May 5, 1977, Washington, DC, Carter Presidential Library and Museum, accessed November 27, 2018.
13      Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), 20.
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Korea served as a stepping-stone to higher rank. Both General Lyman
L. Lemnitzer and General George H. Decker commanded the Eighth
Army in Korea before serving as the chief of staff of the Army.
After the withdrawal of US forces from Vietnam, senior Army
leaders, in the role of United Nations commander, wielded tremendous
influence within South Korea. Ambassador William Gleysteen remarked
that General Richard G. Stilwell “knew he was very important to the
Koreans, because ‘he’ provided security and military assistance to
them—not to mention use of the Command’s golf course and clubs. The
embassy, on the other hand, was usually the source of complaints and
problems.” 14 During the late 1970s, the increasingly authoritarian South
Korean government led by Park Chung Hee looked for support from
America’s military officers rather than the State Department’s civilian
officials. Many Americans, including Vessey, who was the commander
of US and UN forces in Korea, felt the senior US commander had more
access to Park than the US ambassador.15
Shortly after Carter was sworn in, Vessey expressed his misgivings
on the withdrawal plan publicly to the Washington Post and privately to
the president. While the general’s arguments were not in-line with the
president’s thinking, the withdrawal policy was technically still under
review and there were no official guidelines restricting the discussion
of it.16 Other senior Army leaders were also critical of the policy.
Lieutenant General John H. Cushman, commander of I Corps in Korea,
wrote an article supporting a robust US presence in South Korea. But a
prepublication review determined his views were “contrary to policy.” 17
During a visit to Korea in late April 1977, Chief of Staff of the
Army Bernard W. Rogers told senior military leaders that, despite the
ongoing policy review, “the decision in my opinion has been made to
withdraw the forces, and what remains is how they will be withdrawn—
what schedule and what numbers for each milestone.” 18 Presidential
Directive/National Security Council 12 (PD/NSC-12) confirmed his
opinion. One brigade would leave South Korea before December 1978;
the second, June 1980.19 The State and Defense Departments received
tasking memorandums and military assistance plans for the withdrawal.
Army officers in Korea continued to see the withdrawal plan as
ill-considered and hastily approved. Moreover, “an informal plan”
14      William H. Gleysteen Jr. (ambassador to South Korea from 1978–81), interview with
Thomas Stern, June 10, 1997 (Arlington, VA: Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Foreign Affairs Oral History Project [ADST], 2000), 132.
15      Gen John W. Vessey Jr. (commanding general of the Eighth US Army; commander of US
Forces, Korea; and commander in chief of the United Nations command in Korea from 1976–79),
interview 19 with Thomas Saylor, August 29, 2012 (Saint Paul, MN: Concordia University, 2014), 24.
16      Vessey, interview 20, September 6, 2012, 12–13.
17      John H. Cushman, Korea 1976–1978—A Memoir (self-pub., October 2013), 25.
18      Hearings on Review of the Policy Decision to Withdraw United States Ground Forces from Korea Before
the Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 95th cong. 83
(1977) (statement of Bernard W. Rogers, Chief of Staff of the Army).
19      Jimmy Carter to the Vice President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense, “U.S. Policy
in Korea Presidential Directive/NSC-12,” May 5, 1977, Washington, DC, Carter Presidential Library
and Museum, accessed November 27, 2018.
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among senior Army officers “gradually took shape in opposition
to troop withdrawal.” 20 Three weeks after the president signed PD/
NSC-12, Major General John K. Singlaub, chief of staff of US forces
in Korea, made comments understood to be off-the-record during an
interview with Washington Post reporter John Saar in Seoul.21 The most
inflammatory segment of the interview captured Singlaub’s contention,
“If U.S. ground troops are withdrawn on the schedule suggested, it
will lead to war.” 22 Within the Washington bureaucracy, Singlaub’s
comments regarding the dangerous and destabilizing policy further
polarized the president’s White House staff and their opponents in the
State and Defense Departments.23
Within Carter’s inner circle, the issue of a withdrawal from Korea
was less important than increasing presidential power and preparing for
upcoming bureaucratic battles. Hamilton Jordan, a close personal friend
of Carter and a senior political strategist, wrote, “This is an opportunity
for you to firmly establish the position of your administration on
the question of civilian control of the military establishment. . . . It
is important for the military establishment to realize that when they
challenge your decisions and judgements, they do so at the risk of their
own careers.” 24
On May 21, 1977, President Carter officially relieved General Singlaub
of his position as a result of his comments. The action discouraged
direct challenges to presidential decisions but increased debate. Thomas
Stern, a Foreign Service officer stationed in Seoul remarked, “Singlaub
took it upon himself to challenge Carter publicly on this whole question
of troop withdrawal. That helped to raise the issue in both public and
private channels.” 25 Public commentators agreed, “White House drama
served only to give [the Singlaub affair] far more significance and
substance than it deserved.” 26
The high-profile dispute provided an opening for Congress to
hold hearings and potentially slow Carter’s withdrawal plan. During
congressional testimony, Singlaub reiterated the consultation process
had been rushed and had shunned the input of military officers.27
The testimony also revealed the United Nations Command in Korea
formally requested a rationale for the decision and the long-range
20      James V. Young, Eye on Korea: An Insider Account of Korean-American Relations (College Station:
Texas A&M University Press, 2003), 43.
21      John K. Singlaub, Hazardous Duty: An American Soldier in the Twentieth Century (New York,
Summit Books, 1991), 385–86.
22      John Saar, “U.S. General: Korea Pullout Risks War,” Washington Post, May 19, 1977.
23      John K. Singlaub, Hazardous Duty, 385–86; and William H. Gleysteen Jr., Massive Entanglement,
Marginal Influence: Carter and Korea in Crisis (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 23.
24      Hamilton Jordan to President Carter, “General Singlaub,” n.d., container 37, Office of the
Chief of Staff Files, Hamilton Jordan’s Confidential Files, Singlaub, General, container 37, folder
for General Singlaub, series of Hamilton Jordan’s Confidential Files, collection of the Office of the
Chief of Staff Files, Carter Presidential Library and Museum, accessed November 27, 2018.
25      John T. Bennett and Thomas Stern, interview with Charles Stuart Kennedy, October 2, 1987,
(Arlington, VA: ADST, Training, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, 2000), 17.
26      “The Singlaub Affair,” Washington Post, May 24, 1977.
27      Hearings on Review of the Policy Decision, 9.
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policy objectives because of the military’s exclusion from the matter.28
Singlaub’s testimony cited the growing number of intelligence reports on
the increased North Korean threat.29
The hearings led to a sharp increase in studies of and senior official
visits to Korea. Military officers actively presented facts and opinions
to friendly congressmen. Once a relationship was developed between
a senior officer and Congress, visits and “fact-finding” trips could
further present the Army’s message opposing the withdrawal. Vessey
remarked, “I don’t say that I searched for them. I think that would be
inaccurate. But I found out who they were.” The general “welcomed
them on their trips to Korea and then made sure that they were taken to
the Demilitarized Zone and could see the situation there, and had good
briefings on both the strengths and weaknesses of the armed forces of
the Republic of Korea as well as our own. I don’t think we did anything that
I would call dishonest or misleading. On the other hand, we certainly didn’t tell them
that President Carter’s plan was a good idea.” 30
While Army leaders built connections and influence in Congress,
the administration also strengthened its position. During his June 8,
1977, commencement address at the United States Military Academy,
Secretary of the Army Clifford Alexander Jr. took a hard line on military
subordination. He outlined three distinct forums, with variable degrees
of independence. First, military officers were free to offer opinions
within their chain of command until a decision was reached. Second,
when appearing before Congress, an officer is free to express a personal
opinion but is bound to cite and support policy. Lastly, when dealing
with the media, an officer should know when a policy is established or
still under discussion and express that to the media. Alexander warned,
“Attempts to achieve outside the chain of command what one could
not achieve inside the chain of command are out of keeping with this
tradition [of the president as commander in chief] and inconsistent with
military professionalism.” 31
As the White House and civilian officials attempted to continue
tightening the framework for public discussion by Army leaders,
Congress continued the hearings, which provided a forum for military
officers to cast doubt on Carter’s Korea policy throughout the summer
of 1977. The commander of I Corps in Korea, the current and retired
commander of US Forces Korea, the commander of Pacific Air Forces,
the commander in chief of the Pacific Command, the Army chief of
staff, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs were all called to testify
on the Korea withdrawal plan. Each expressed reservations about the
withdrawal plan. And their testimony was used by Carter’s congressional
opponents and hawkish Democrats to strengthen their arguments.
28      Hearings on Review of the Policy Decision, 10.
29      Singlaub, Hazardous Duty, 401.
30      Vessey, interview 21, September 13, 2012, 5 (emphasis added).
31      Headquarters Air Force, message, 172355Z, ”Statements by Defense Officials,” June 1977,
quoted in Felix F. Moran, “Free Speech, the Military, and the National Interest,” Air University Review
31, no. 4 (May–June 1980): 112.
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Testifying in August, Chief of Staff of the Army General Rogers was
asked, “Were the Joint Chiefs ever asked whether troops should be
withdrawn from Korea?” He responded bluntly, “They were not.”
Under oath, Rogers also testified he had no idea when the
announced withdrawal should begin. When asked about the value of
American troops in South Korea, Rogers stated, “I think it makes two
contributions. First, as a deterrent, and second, if under conditions of
combat the national command authority released the 2d Division for use
by 8th Army, it could make a contribution in the area of war-fighting
capability as well.” 32 The ongoing hearings were highly effective in
shaping opposition to Carter’s policies. By late July, official polls showed
52 percent of Americans disapproved of Carter’s withdrawal plan.33
In addition to working closely with Congress to cast doubt on official
policy, military officers cultivated intelligence that magnified the North
Korean threat. Due to a lack of human intelligence, estimates of North
Korea’s forces had been constrained to satellite imagery. In January 1978,
Vessey asked for an assessment of North Korea’s military capabilities.34
The Defense Intelligence Agency produced a report in May 1978 that
sharply increased both the size and the capability of North Korean
forces, identifying more than three entirely new combat divisions.35
Disseminating these revised threat assessments put additional pressure
on the Carter administration to delay or to halt the withdrawal program.
On April 21, 1978, Carter delayed the first increment of withdrawals.
While the redeployment of 2,600 noncombat elements and a combat
battalion by the end of the year would proceed as planned, two of the
combat battalions scheduled for withdrawal in 1978 would remain, at
least until 1979.36 Military officers were not subtle in rejoicing. One
wrote, “At last, a reprieve!” 37 On July 29, 1979, Carter announced the
suspension of US troop withdrawals from Korea. The administration
remembered the military opposition, and in 1979, Vessey was passed
over for the position of chief of staff.38

Conclusion

Although President Carter demonstrated his official power by
relieving Singlaub, he was less successful at stopping Vessey from
pursuing a Fabian strategy that increased the political costs and security
32      Hearings on Review of the Policy Decision, 95–71.
33      “Public Likes Carter, Survey Finds, More for His Style than Programs,” New York Times/
CBS News Poll, July 29, 1977, 1; Larry K. Niksch, “US Troop Withdrawal from South Korea: Past
Shortcomings and Future Prospects,” Asian Survey 21, no. 3 (March 1981), 329.
34      Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel, The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 478.
35      Joe Wood, “Persuading a President: Jimmy Carter and American Troops in Korea,” Studies in
Intelligence 40, no. 4 (1996): 98, 106.
36      Steven L. Rearden and Kenneth R. Foulks Jr., The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy,
1977–1980 (Washington, DC: Office of Joint History, 2015), 158.
37      Ward M. Le Hardy, “Where the Dawn Comes Up Like Thunder: The Army’s Future Role in
the Pacific,” Parameters 8, no. 4 (1978): 37.
38      Young, Eye on Korea, 46–47.
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risks of withdrawing forces from Korea. The Army’s ability to oppose
presidential policy and win the political debate was due to a congruence
of domestic political factors and bureaucratic skills. First, the Army
leveraged its position in South Korea to present itself as the expert
voice on the North Korean threat and South Korean requirements.
Second, the Army provided an issue that polarized congressional
Democrats, allowing military officers to serve as “expert witnesses,”
which was critical to creating a nonpolitical narrative. Lastly, the
statements and testimony of Army leaders focused on the short time
span of deliberations and the rushed nature of the process. This oblique
criticism highlighted the Carter administration’s opaque policy process
and politicized decision-making.
Although Army leaders were clearly manipulative and pushed the
boundaries of professional ethics, they effectively halted a deeply flawed
withdrawal policy. Viewed from a distance of forty years, President
Carter’s politicized policy process and shortsighted mentality of
reducing deterrence capabilities on the Korean Peninsula were clearly
dangerous. Singlaub and Vessey, as the subject matter experts on the
American military role in South Korea, should have been consulted. Yet
the generals’ actions led to a more comprehensive debate of American
security policy in Korea. As the case of the aborted Korean withdrawal
highlights, Army leaders can successfully challenge presidential policies.
But the question is should they?

